A key element of the business structure for electronic markets is the design of price schedules for transaction services. Stock exchanges and transaction service providers around the world regard transaction fees not only as a major source of income but also as an incentive mechanism for investors. In this paper, we discuss the principles of nonlinear transaction fee schedules and present the results of a field experiment on investor order behaviour. We find that the number and the volume of orders are influenced by the transaction fee schedule. Furthermore, the initial endowment of participants has an impact on the price elasticity of the demand for transaction services. The discussion highlights the need for a structured approach for price schedule design in the context of market engineering.
Introduction
Transaction fees of services in electronic financial markets are a major source of income for stock exchanges and transaction service providers around the world as well as a major incentive mechanism for investors regarding their order behaviour. Recent developments in the design of price schedules such as 'free trade' and 'no fee' offers by banks and brokerages emphasise the relevance of research on the structured engineering of price schedules and customer price sensitivity regarding transaction services. Obviously, customers are aware of different price schedules and take them into consideration when they decide about placing their order.
In general, price schedules of transaction services may depend on several variables, including the volume of the order, both on a per-trade and a per-period basis. Another variable that may be employed is the sum of transaction fees already paid in a specific period of time. Depending on these variables, price schedules can be classified into different classes of schedules, differing in complexity, depth, and therefore ability for price discrimination.
The contribution of this paper is threefold: First, we introduce a formal specification for transaction fee schedules and expand it to floors and caps. Second, we transfer the research on nonlinear price schedule design to transaction fee schedules, taking distinct features of electronic financial markets into account. Third, we present the results of a field experiment on the order behaviour of investors facing changing transaction fee schedules. This field experiment is regarded as a contribution towards the structured approach of price schedule design in the context of market engineering (Weinhardt et al., 2003) .
The paper is organised as follows: In the next section, we review the relevant literature related to nonlinear pricing and transaction fees, give an introduction to nonlinear price schedule types, and highlight design issues. Section 3 introduces fixed fee schedules, their optimisation, and their use in practice. Section 4 describes the field experiment, which we have conducted, its design, the hypotheses, and the results. Section 5 concludes and gives an outlook on future research.
Nonlinear price schedule design

Related work
Much work has been done around transaction costs in financial markets, but most of the literature focuses on implicit transaction costs like spread or market impact. Commissions and fees are usually neglected.
Nonlinear pricing has been examined -among others -by Oi (1971) , Ng and Weisser (1974) , Leland and Meyer (1976) and Goldman et al. (1984) . Nonlinear price schedules are defined as price schedules with a nonproportional relationship between volume and total price, i.e., the marginal and average prices vary with the quantity purchased. Brown and Sibley (1986) investigate nonlinear pricing in the context of public utility pricing. Wilson (1993) studied nonlinear pricing and tariff design in the context of electricity and telephone markets. Both texts approach nonlinear pricing by modelling consumers' decisions in the 'classic' microeconomic tradition. For practitioners, this approach does not seem to be easily applicable since the results are based on a set of assumptions, which have to be estimated in order to find the optimal solution. Furthermore, Wilson does not take marketing and communication aspects into account. Dolan (1987) integrates the economics and marketing literature and presents an overview of possible motivations for quantity discounts. He narrows his tariff design to three basic types, which he compares with each other. Although Dolan presents some price schedule design issues for pricing managers, these should be further expanded and detailed to be an integral part of the market engineering approach.
The price effects of changes in transaction costs are first studied in Amihud and Mendelsson (1986) . They suggest a causal relationship between transaction costs and asset prices. They assume, however, that turnover is unaffected by transaction costs, which is generally not applicable to real-world equity markets. The effect of a transaction cost change on the order behaviour of investors is studied in a couple of empirical papers: Umlauf (1993) studied the effect of transaction taxes on the behaviour of the Swedish stock market, Jackson and O'Donnell (1985) use data from the London Stock Exchange to investigate the effects of a transaction tax on the number of shares traded. Michaely and Vila (1996) show that order volume is decreasing in transaction costs. All of these studies, however, do not take different types of transaction fees into account. Our study intends to close this gap and shed some light on the behaviour of investors being confronted with changing transaction fees.
Types of nonlinear price schedules
A price schedule specifies the relation between the marginal price per unit and the number of units per transaction. Most generally, a price schedule can be represented by a function R(q) where R(q) is the transaction fee for the order size q. Nonlinear price schedules can be classified into two-part schedules, two-block schedules, and all-units quantity discount schedules (Dolan, 1987, p. 2).
• Two-part price schedules (Figure 1(a) ) consist of a fixed fee F and a constant marginal price p. Essentially, the customer pays the fixed fee F for the right to place an order at all, and a variable fee pq depending on the size q of the order. The two-part schedule can be written as:
• Two-block price schedules (Figure 1(b) ) consist of two different marginal prices p 1 and p 2 where p 1 q is charged for an order size of up to x units. If the order is greater than x, the first x units are priced at p 1 x, and all subsequent units are priced at p 2 per unit. This can be written as:
• All-units quantity discount schedules (Figure 2(a) ) consist of several different marginal prices, which are applied for each unit depending on the total size of the order. That means if a certain quantity level is exceeded, the corresponding marginal price applies to all units. The mathematical formula for the all-units quantity discount schedule is as follows:
As a result of the different marginal prices associated with different quantities, all-units quantity discount schedules require that there are discontinuities in the R(q) function. In reality, if a customer places an order of a size that is slightly less than a breakpoint, a fee associated with the corresponding breakpoint size will typically be charged. This results in the effective all-units quantity discount schedule (Figure 2(b) ), which therefore must have flat portions at the breakpoint size. 
Caps and floors
Transaction fee caps and floors are commonly used instruments for securing minimum fees to cover costs and for giving buyers an incentive to place large orders. Since caps and floors are widely integrated into existing price schedules, we develop a formal representation analogue to the one in the previous paragraphs. Floors are minimum fees and represent the lower border for the price schedule whereas caps are maximum fees representing the upper border. Figure 3 We can adapt our formal representation of a two-block schedule in a way so that it accommodates the construction of caps and floors. The breakpoint sizes x f and x c can be expressed as functions of the other parameters.
For marketing and communication purposes, companies usually communicate the block price schedule along with the values for the cap and the floor instead of integrating them into one combined effective price schedule. Thus, customers can easily identify minimum and maximum fees and make instant decisions based on these values.
Design parameters
Several design issues are discussed in Dolan (1987) , especially price schedule type, price schedule complexity, price schedule depth, and the qualifying unit base. Munson and Rosenblatt (1998) identify four characteristics of quantity discounts: form, number of price breaks, item aggregation, and time aggregation.
Type (or form) refers to the question whether to use incremental or all-units quantity discounts. In the field study conducted by Munson and Rosenblatt, most of the companies use all-units quantity discounts whereas 37% use incremental quantity discounts and 29% use fixed cost models. Therefore, the differences between these models should be examined. Dolan discusses equivalencies between two-part and two-block price schedules. As a result, design efforts can be constrained to support n-block price schedules since a two-part schedule can easily be written as an equivalent two-block schedule with a prohibitively high marginal price in the first block effectively representing a fixed fee for the customers.
Price schedule complexity also has to be considered in a marketing context. Although it can be shown that n + 1 breaks are strictly better than just n breaks (Moorthy, 1984) , it seems to be fair to assume that customers prefer a simpler schedule over a more complex one with a higher number of price breaks. Munson and Rosenblatt state that all of their interviewees had less than ten price breaks with the majority having even less than five. Most companies prefer less complicated price schedules because they are cheaper to communicate and calculate.
Price schedule depth, which characterises the magnitude of the discount, is an important economic design parameter because it has to be considered in the context of customer price elasticity of demand and willingness-to-pay.
The qualifying unit base is a key parameter for the development of a price schedule framework including price schedules, caps, and floors. For example, the unit base could either be quantity, volume (in terms of monetary units), or transaction fees paid. Very similar to the qualifying unit base parameter is the item aggregation parameter, which specifies whether the discount applies to one or multiple products. For example, companies may want to offer Business Volume Discounts (BVDs) when they are interested in becoming significant suppliers rather than marketing individual products (Munson and Rosenblatt, 1998) .
The time aggregation parameter determines which time frame is used (e.g., one year, one month, or one transaction). In practice, 76% of the study participants stated that they use discounts that aggregate over time. The time aggregation parameter also determines when the customer actually receives the quantity discount. Using per-transaction quantity discounts, the discount may be deducted instantly from the amount to be paid by the customer. Alternatively, the discount can be received as a rebate after a specific period of time when using discounts that are aggregated over time. The latter is usually done if the exact amount of the quantity discount is unknown before the time period has passed, or if it is unknown whether or not the customer qualifies for the discount.
Transaction fee schedules for e-marketplaces
Motivation
Electronic exchanges and market places have a particular cost structure for offering their transaction services: On the one hand, they incur high fixed costs for providing the technical infrastructure for market access, provision of pre-and post-trade information, order routing and matching, and clearing and settlement infrastructure. On the other hand, variable costs per order execution are relatively small when compared with the high fixed costs.
During our analysis of nonlinear price schedules, we have regarded the volume of the executed order as the variable according to which we would like to differentiate between customer segments and therefore offer different prices. The costs per order execution, however, are such that there are usually marginal costs of zero per order execution. That means the execution of an order with a volume of e.g., $100 bears the same costs as the execution of an order with a volume of $10,000. This assumption holds only if there is enough liquidity in the market, i.e., matching between orders can take place immediately. Otherwise, the search for or the provision of liquidity might be very costly.
With zero marginal costs per order execution, the transaction service provider is able to offer price schedules with a fixed part (as in a two-part schedule) and no variable part since no marginal costs have to be covered by the variable fee. The remainder of this section deals with the design and use of fixed fee schedules.
Fixed fee schedules
Flat fees
A flat fee price schedule is a price schedule that does not charge a volume-based variable fee but only a fixed fee independent of the quantity. As such, a price schedule with flat fees represents a nonlinear quantity discount price schedule, since traders with higher volumes are rewarded with lower average costs.
Since the transaction price is independent of the order volume, demand depends on the saturation quantity of each trader. Therefore, a flat fee price schedule should in general only be applied if the saturation quantity is not infinitely high, if there are natural borders for consumption or if variable costs are zero. In our case, the transaction service provider faces marginal costs of zero. Therefore, a flat rate price schedule is a feasible option for the provision of transaction services.
Stepped price schedules
As an extension of flat fees, stepped price schedules consist of several fixed prices for different quantities. They are similar to n-block schedules with the restriction of having marginal prices of zero. Each fixed fee is designed for a specific trader segment and represents the traders' willingness-to-pay for their saturation quantity. Figure 4 (a) depicts such a price schedule with the willingness-to-pay functions of three different customer segments. The prices have been chosen so as to capture the whole consumer surplus from each customer segment. 
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Optimisation of fixed fee schedules
To make a statement about the optimality of price schedules, we need to make assumptions about the consumers' objective function, which they use to make their order decision. In the economic literature, it is often assumed that each consumer tries to maximise his individual utility (Leland and Meyer, 1976) , and this utility is often expressed by consumer's surplus (Willig, 1976) . Therefore, the consumer's surplus determines the participation decision as well as the quantity decision.
The following requirements have to be taken into consideration:
• fees and quantity breaks have to be chosen so that high-volume customers cannot fill their high-volume transaction by placing multiple low-volume orders for a lower than their designated flat fee
• a cannibalisation of tariffs must be avoided, i.e., each customer should select the quantity that has been tailored for him (this constraint is usually termed incentive-compatibility constraint)
• total price designed for a specific customer group must not exceed the customers' willingness-to-pay (participation constraint).
The first requirement is analogous to the requirement that nonlinear price schedules usually have to be concave, i.e., their marginal prices decrease with the order volume (block-declining rates, e.g., Wilson, 1993, p.109; Dolan, 1987, p.8) . In the case of the stepped fixed fee price schedule, we have to make sure that the average fee for each price step i is smaller than the average fee for the first price step (p 1 ). Otherwise, consumers would be able to replicate their order quantity for a lower price than their designated price:
The second requirement concerns the self-selection by the consumer. To select his designated flat fee, the consumer surplus he can receive in his designated part of the price schedule must be at least as high as the consumer surplus received in any other part. For example, a customer of segment 2 (for whom fixed fee F 2 is tailored) should receive as much consumer surplus from ordering quantity q 2 as from ordering quantity q 1 . Therefore, in the example figure above, fee F 2 should be lowered. Analogously, fee F 3 should be lowered in the same way. Figure 4 (b) illustrates this change. A formal specification of this requirement can be shown using the representation of the consumers' quadratic willingness-to-pay function from the example. Let us assume that the willingness-to-pay function is of the following type:
To calculate the fixed fee for the second highest consumer, we have to find the price where his consumer surplus from this price and his saturation quantity equals his consumer surplus from the next lower price and the quantity at which he would be charged this price. The lowest volume consumer is charged a fixed fee that equals his saturation willingness-to-pay (this fulfils his participation constraint) while the other fixed fees are calculated recursively as follows:
These fixed fees guarantee that each consumer chooses the volume and pays exactly the fee tailored for him according to his willingness-to-pay function.
Examples
In this section, we will give an overview of the existing transaction fee schedules for the largest stock exchanges in Europe. We present the results of the survey in tabular format.
We have studied each transaction fee schedule and categorised them into three high-level types of price schedules: variable, stepped, and fixed. We also indicate whether the variable transaction fee schedules use caps or floors. Please note that each exchange may offer different price schedule types simultaneously and thus offer a menu of different tariffs to their customers. As can be seen in Table 1 , almost all of the surveyed exchanges use floors in their variable transaction fee schedules; many of them also use caps. Two of the 12 exchanges have adopted stepped fee schedules. Fixed fee schedules are used on half of the exchanges in addition to the variable fee schedules. Euronext's transaction fee model is a good example for the combination of different types of price schedules: There are three different packs of transaction fee models: Pack A is a flat fee per transaction. Pack B incorporates a stepped fee schedule with different fixed fees depending on the transaction volume. In addition, there is a monthly floor that must be paid regardless of the actual transactions. Pack C also comprises a stepped fee schedule with a monthly floor but offers a higher floor and lower fixed fees than Pack B. The stepped fee schedules are depicted in Figure 5 . In addition to the three packs, Euronext demands an ad valorem trade fee of 0.00055% of the trade volume capped at 8€ per trade. Euronext's stepped transaction fee schedule fulfils requirement (6) from above since high volume orders cannot be replicated by several low volume orders. The other requirements cannot be verified easily because we do not have information about the investors' willingness-to-pay functions. From the transaction fee models, however, we can assume that the willingness-to-pay for transaction services decreases with the transaction volume per order as well as accumulated per month. The Euronext example highlights the need for the detailed analysis of customer segments before introducing new price schedules.
A field experiment on transaction fees
Motivation
The previous sections have shown that information and knowledge about different customer types is necessary to design an optimal profit-maximising price schedule. While empirical research on the distribution of transaction volume and frequency is needed to identify different customer segments, further research has to focus on the order behaviour of customers when being confronted with changing price schedules.
To get an understanding about customer behaviour following a change of the transaction fee schedule, we have conducted a field experiment in which there are:
• different customer segments according to their initial endowment • different transaction fees over the total trading period of three weeks.
The control over the design of the transaction fee schedules enables us to draw conclusions about the influence of transaction fees on the order behaviour of investors.
There are several research questions that arise in the context of nonlinear transaction fee pricing.
• What is the price elasticity of demand in the context of transaction services?
Are customers sensitive to price changes at all? Are there other -more important -determinants of their trading decision?
• Can investors be segmented into groups that differ in their 
Experimental design
In our trading experiment, traders could trade virtual stocks on an electronic platform within a time period of three weeks. During these three weeks, traders faced transaction fees of different types. Order frequency and volume were measured and related to the price schedule in place.
Setting
The task of the subjects was to trade virtual stocks on the internet in a time period of three weeks during the FIFA World Cup 2006. The system we used was STOCCER, an experimental forecasting market for the FIFA World Cup (Luckner et al., 2005) . Subjects were given an initial endowment in play money and virtual stocks. They could buy portfolios of stocks at no risk since each portfolio had a fixed price.
Subjects and groups
Sixty students, most of them undergraduate students in information engineering and management, served as subjects for the experiment. They were grouped into three groups of traders: A, B, and C.
Group A was used as a control group with a high initial endowment of shares and money (500,000 monetary units) and no transaction fees. Group B also had the high endowment but faced transaction fees during the experiment. Group C also faced transaction fees -the same as group B -but started with a much lower endowment (50,000 monetary units). Please note that subjects could only trade within their own group and not between different groups -therefore, it was a zero-sum game in all three markets.
Transaction fee schedules
For groups B and C, a transaction fee schedule was in place that changed at the beginning of weeks 2 and 3. Subjects were not told that
• there was going to be a change of transaction fees
• how that change would look like.
The transaction fee schedules during the three weeks of the experiment were chosen so as to include the different transaction fee schedules that are commonly used on European stock exchanges (see Section 3.3): An incremental quantity discount variable transaction fee schedule, a stepped fixed fee schedule, and a fixed fee schedule without price breaks. Transaction volume served as the qualifying unit base in each of the different transaction fee schedules. In addition, there was no aggregation over time, which would have made the participants' decision problem too complex.
In the first week, the announcement of the transaction fee was:
"You are charged a fixed fee of 30 monetary units per executed order and a variable commission of 5% of the transaction volume. The minimum transaction fee, however, is 50 monetary units, the maximum fee 250 monetary units."
At the beginning of the second week, a stepped transaction fee schedule was announced as shown in Table 2 . The third week started with an announcement as follows:
"For each transaction you are charged a fixed amount of 150 monetary units independent of the transaction volume."
The different transaction fee schedules are summarised in Figure 6 . 
Incentive schemes
As mentioned earlier, subjects were all paid according to their trading performance. Since all subjects of one group traded in the same continuous double auction, the game was a zero-sum game where the amount gained by one part of the group has been lost by the other. Therefore, cheating was not attractive for the subjects. Since the transaction fees were subtracted from the payment, subjects had an incentive to minimise transaction fees in order to get a higher payment. There was another incentive scheme in place to encourage subjects to trade and to prevent a 'free-riding' without taking part actively in the experiment. We established a minimum transaction volume of 50,000 monetary units per week in groups A and B, and a minimum transaction volume of 5,000 monetary units per week in group C. This threshold represented 10% of their endowment (money plus stocks) so that this requirement could be easily fulfilled. If the minimum transaction volume was not met, a penalty fee was subtracted from their final pay-off.
Hypotheses
We examine the following hypotheses:
Number of orders
The number of orders per trader and week is decreasing from week 1 to week 2 and from week 2 to week 3, since transaction fees have been increased for small volume orders and decreased for high volume orders. Thus, assuming a constant weekly trading volume, traders will place fewer orders (with a higher volume) in order to reduce their overall transaction fees.
Average order volume
Owing to the changes in transaction fees, traders will place fewer orders with a higher volume and therefore increase their average order volume.
Sensitivity to transaction fee changes
Traders with a high endowment will react more sensitive to transaction fee changes than traders with a small endowment. This is due to the fact that usually "the demand schedule of small buyers is more inelastic over the relevant price range than that of large buyers" (Buchanan, 1953) .
Results
The results can be categorised into the following dimensions: number of orders, order volume, number of transactions, and transaction volume. While the orders indicate a general willingness-to-trade, transactions (i.e., executed orders) indicate an agreement between the traders. For our purposes, we include all submitted orders in our analysis because we would like to capture the intention of the traders regarding the volume and the number of their orders. Table 3 shows the median and mean volumes for orders as well as transactions. While the number of orders indicates that there is an average success rate of about 60%, the difference between order and transaction volumes shows that many of the orders could not be filled immediately. This is due to the fact that small market orders hit larger limit orders and therefore cause a partial execution. Table 3 Descriptive statistics for number and average volume of orders and transactions for groups A, B, and C The results are presented in the form of box plots: Box plots are able to visually show different types of populations without any assumptions of the statistical distribution. A box plot depicts the smallest observation, the lower quartile, the median, the upper quartile, and the largest observation. In addition, box plots can identify outliers, which are defined as being more than 1.5 interquartile ranges away from the lower/upper quartile. In the following, extreme outliers are being omitted because of clarity of presentation.
The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test (Sheskin, 2004, p.609 ) is used to compare the sample populations observed before and after a change of the transaction fee. The test hypothesis is whether the two dependent samples from the same group represent two different populations. The test is conducted for each of the three groups and the two transaction fee changes. This test has been chosen because there are two dependent samples, which we would like to compare, and the underlying distribution of the populations is unknown.
Number of orders per trader
The following box plots depict the distribution of the number of orders each trader submitted during the first, second, and third week, respectively. Figure 7 shows the distributions of the number of orders submitted by the different trader groups (A-C) and weeks (1-3). While control group A does not show a significant decrease in the number of orders (it rather shows a slight increase), groups B and C show decreases in the number of orders. In case of group A, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, i.e., it cannot be concluded that the populations of the samples are different. In case of groups B and C, the number of orders per trader is decreasing. The Wilcoxon test shows a highly significant decrease ( p < 0.001) in group B after the first change in the transaction fee, and a weakly significant decrease in group C for both transaction fee changes ( p = 0.09 and p = 0.05, respectively). We cannot, however, observe a significant difference from week 2 to week 3 in group B.
Average order volume per trader
The following box plots in Figure 8 show the average order volume per trader, sorted by group and week. In group A, we can see a slight increase in the order volume, which is not significant at the 0.1 level ( p = 0.24 and p = 0.12). In group B, there is no increase in order volume from week 1 to week 2, but a significant increase ( p = 0.021) from week 2 to week 3. For group C, a significant increase ( p = 0.039) can be observed after the first week, and no change after the second week.
Sensitivity to transaction fee changes
In this section, we try to identify different sensitivities to transaction fee changes depending on initial endowment and order volume. As can be seen in Figure 6 , there are specific order volume ranges where the transaction fee has been increased, and there are specific volume ranges where the transaction fee has been lowered. To analyse the different sensitivities to transaction fee changes, we have depicted the changes in average order volume per order in Table 4 . Please note that we only examine the volume ranges where a change in the average transaction fee could be observed.
After week 1, transaction fees were increased by 12% on average for orders with a volume of up to 3500 monetary units while transaction fees were decreased by 17% in average for orders with a volume of 3500-6000 monetary units. As expected, both groups facing transaction fees react to the changes with a decrease in the number of orders in the lower volume range and an increase in the number of orders in the higher volume range. We have included the changes in the number of orders by group A as well in order to isolate the effect due to the changes in transaction fees and control for changes that are due to other factors such as time or other outside effects.
After week 2, the volume ranges in which transaction fees have been increased and decreased differ from the ranges for the first transaction fee change. The phenomenon of a lower number of orders in the lower volume range and a higher number of orders in the upper range for groups B and C remains the same.
To compare the sensitivity of the two groups towards the transaction fee changes, we calculate the price elasticity of demand with the following formula representing the ratio of percentage changes (e.g., Wilson, 1993, p.50 
After the first transaction fee change, group B showed a higher price elasticity of demand than group C in the lower volume range, and a lower elasticity in the upper volume range.
Following the transaction fee change after week 2, we observe a higher price elasticity of demand in group B than in group C. Furthermore, the price elasticity in the lower volume range is lower than in the higher volume range for both groups. 
Discussion
The field experiment, which we have conducted, shows that traders adapt their order behaviour when they are confronted with a different transaction fee schedule. Concerning the number of orders per trader, we found that traders in groups B and C decreased their number of orders while traders in group A even increased the number of orders. As opposed to the number of orders, the average order volume increased in all three groups although significant results could only be found in groups B and C. These two phenomena were expected since traders adapted their order behaviour to the changing transaction fee schedules while simultaneously following the minimum order volume per week. That means they shifted towards fewer orders with higher volume in order to take advantage of the new transaction fee schedules.
Furthermore, we have seen another phenomenon regarding different sensitivity towards transaction fee changes. The group of traders with high initial endowment generally showed a higher price elasticity of demand than the group of traders with low endowment with one exception: In the order volume range of 3500-6000 monetary units, group C shows a higher elasticity than group B. This result could be due to the fact that since the majority of traders in group C placed orders with a volume lower than 3500, a few traders were able to have a high impact on the distribution of trades.
To sum up, we have observed different price elasticities in groups of traders that differed in their initial endowment and therefore their willingness-to-pay. This is an important result, which has to be further validated in the case of e-market transaction fees. Knowledge about the sensitivity of different groups of traders is a crucial requirement for transaction service providers designing their price schedules. Furthermore, nonlinear price schedules can only be optimised to discriminate between different customer segments when taking their different willingness-to-pay functions into account. This field experiment can be regarded as a first approach towards a structured price schedule design in market engineering.
Conclusion and outlook
Nonlinear pricing is a powerful instrument to extract additional consumer's surplus and discriminate among heterogeneous consumer groups. Transaction service providers such as e-markets and stock exchanges use nonlinear pricing depending on the order volume to discriminate between different groups of traders and to give larger traders higher discounts.
Price schedule design is one of the most important elements of the business structure of markets, since it determines the turnover and therefore the firm's profits. However, a structured design process for determining optimal price schedules for e-market transactions is missing.
This paper has presented a formal representation and the results of a study about the use of nonlinear transaction fee schedules in reality. Optimisation of such fee schedules depends on the knowledge of the customers' willingness-to-pay for transaction services and their sensitivity towards transaction fee changes. This problem is addressed in Section 4 where we have outlined a field experiment in which we investigated the effect of changing transaction fees on the order behaviour of traders. The experiment has shown that traders react to changing transaction fee schedules, and that groups differing in their initial endowment also differ in their price elasticity.
While there are first promising results, there are a couple of points, which still have to be addressed:
• The results of the field experiment have to be verified in follow-up experiments.
Although field experiments provide first insights into the behaviour of traders, some elements cannot be controlled for. For example, one might want to consider lab experiments that are able to further refine the results presented here. Lab experiments also enable us to analyse the effectiveness of different transaction fee schedules in detail, e.g., the incentive compatibility constraint of transaction fee schedules.
• We have assumed that the market operator acts as a monopolist. In the real world, this might not be the case with many exchanges facing competition by other exchanges and trading venues competing for market share. Therefore, a competitive setting should be taken into consideration.
• There might also be factors other than price upon which traders base their trading decisions. For example, traders could take the quality of order execution or market share into consideration when placing their orders. In a competitive setting, the model could be enhanced by quality or market share parameters.
To conclude, a structured approach for the design of price schedules is necessary to accomplish the different goals of companies in the execution business. Future work needs to be done on integrating price schedule design into the holistic market engineering process. Computer-Aided Market Engineering should be extended to include tools for analysing customer preferences and suggest optimal design parameters for price schedules based on economic as well as marketing principles.
